Kant's Real and exact Relation to Idealism.

The different schools of Idealism and their characteristic doctrine- Platonic, Aristotelian, Plotinian, Leibnitzian, Berkeleyian, Cartesian. Kant's position. Real Meaning of his "Refutation of Idealism" in the Critique of Pure Reason.

A Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
conditions for the degree of M. A.
College of Letters, University of California.

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It is eminently proper to begin the study of idealism with a review of Plato's "theory of ideas" the development of which is intended to form an essential part in his theory of knowledge and is the initial attempt to overcome the dualism between mind and matter.

Since there can be no science that is founded on the basis of a fleeting sensationalism, Plato felt constrained to seek for some ultimate reality which should give validity to experience. His predecessors had had the same problem and some has sought for a fundamental reality in a material cause of the world itself.

Plato begins as an eclectic, seizing first on the Socratic concept, that is, by the process of induction he found the fundamental, universal or logical unity underlying the particulars, which he conceived by presupposition as a real definite existence. Next, he examined the Heraclitic principle of an absolute becoming and the Eleatic doctrine of an absolute being. To come to an understanding with the principles of these two schools is the ob-

ject of the Sophist, Theatetus and Parmenides. This is accomplished in the Theatetus polemically against the principle of an absolute becoming, in the Sophist polemically against the principle of abstract being, and in the Parmenides irenically in relation to the Eleatic one.

In the Parmenides we find there is a unity in the manifold. Every thought involves relations. In the Theatetus, after a complete refutation of Protagoras, Plato attains to the positive ground that there must be an a priori power of the mind because it is not possible to apprehend through the senses what all things have in common, hence he finally attains to a deduction of the categories- a priori principles in terms of which external objects get their definition and reality.

In the Sophist we have re-enforced the thoughts expressed in the Parmenides. The relation between being and not-being carries with it a revised notion of the theory of ideas. Ideas are evidently dynamic. Every thought seems to involve countless relations, there is a universal in every particular. "He who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude and many different forms contained under one higher form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms existing only in separation and isolation."

Plato's generic idea or universal is abstract. His category of the real exists, contrary, to of the belief of Aristotle and Kant, independent of the objects. He cannot be called a conceptualist for it was out of the conceptualism of Socrates' that his problem had arisen.

At the end of the sixth book of the Republic, Plato suggests an hierarchy of ideas at the head of which stands the idea of the Metaphysical Good which he seems to regard as identical with God. But this notion is not worked out.

In the last book of the Republic, the "Idea of the Good" occupies a supreme position above all others. It is the ultimate unity and explanation of all knowledge and it is the source of all knowing and of all being, higher even than being itself. It is the one ultimate principle in the universe. In Republic Bk. X 597, the "Nature Worker" is spoken of as making the ideas and the example taken is the idea of a bed or couch which is imitated by the carpenter whose imitation is in turn imitated by the painter, who makes a picture of the bed. This seems to be the explicit meaning of the passage referred to, though it should doubtless not be taken quite literally.

In the Phaedo, he insists on the oneness of each idea as contrasted with the multiplicity of the things we perceive but hard-

ly anything is said of the relation of the ideas to one another nor does he seem decided how universals are related to particulars.

In the Republic 476 A, ideas of just, unjust, good and evil are each in itself one, but by sharing in actions and bodies and in one another they are manifested in all sorts of ways and so each of them although one, appears many. What Plato seems to mean is that in phenomenal things we find not merely a single idea manifested in all the members of a class but that variety also arises from the possibility of the ideas being combined with one another in different ways.

As the Atomists explained the diversity of their world by the different combinations of atoms and by the analogy of the alphabet forming various words through different combinations, so too Plato, in a similar manner, conceiving of the separate ideas as letters, might account for the varied phenomena of Nature as due to the way in which the ideas were placed in juxtaposition.

The ideas are not mere creations of our individual thought but have objective validity for all minds; like the truths of mathematics they are supposed to be universal and necessary.

As the Pythagoreans spoke of things being knowable in so far as they imitated numbers, so Plato spoke of things being knowable

only as participating in ideas or forms. The word eidos or idea in ordinary Greek meant simply a shape or manner and it is often used in that way by Plato himself. Plato adopts the term to signify that which is alone the object of real knowledge. The word "idea" is taken to mean what is real in the sense of being the alone permanent and the alone conceivable.

The ideas are causative or, as Royce says, purposive. If we look at a statue and ask what is this statue? We do not want to be told it is made of marble or plaster, we want to know what it means, what it represents, what it "imitates", what it manifests through the senses to the mind. We expect to be told its form. It is Hermes or Apollo. The one form or type of the God conceived by the sculptor may be manifold in many visible and tangible statues, in bronze or ivory, in clay or marble; while the same material if treated in a different manner would no longer be the same statue. The matter, the material, is the medium of manifestation; what is essential in the form.

Plato has tried to escape the dualism between mind and matter but though he has made a notable effort has not succeeded. His doctrine seemed to reconcile Eleaticism, Heracliteanism and Pythagoreanism by assigning flux to the sensible world, keeping unity and fixity for the ideas, separated off into pairs of absolutely

distinguished opposites, like that which the Pythagoreans had enumerated in their list of good and evil things.

Prof. Ritchie offers it as his belief that for a hard and fast dualism Plato has been endeavoring to substitute a doctrine of degrees in reality. For instance, are there ideas of manufactured things? No, not in the full sense that there are ideas of organic species, or moral qualities or mathematical relations. But we can speak of the "idea of a table" as something composite which we can resolve into its form, its matter and its purpose. In the earlier part of his theory Plato had spoken of his positive and negative, as standing on the same level, but later when he attempts to recognize the relative reality of non-being he can allow better for grades of perfection and imperfections. So too, the world of sense is not an illusion but can be known in varying degrees in proportion as it contains more of definiteness and perfection.

We do not pretend that this is the final word on Plato's development of the "ideas" or his contribution to idealism but we do feel that this method and extent of review gives us a foundation on which to build whereby we can see the progress of his successors and what they each aimed to contribute toward the support of the original thesis.

The best way to understand Aristotle is by the comparison of his philosophy with that of Plato, for after one has made an effort to understand both men he is convinced that the pupil expressly aimed to state his views in such manner as would bring them into a pronounced antagonism with the theory of his teacher, and that their respective answer as to what reality is differs more in wording than in meaning.

For our purpose Aristotle's contribution to Plato can best be studied by examining his attitude towards the relation of the individual to the universal and the relation of form and matter. These are not entirely mutually exclusive, the one leads into the other. The first is largely a matter of epistemology; the second advances an original principle which overcomes in a degree the dualism which we find left over in Plato.

He had said that which in a true and original sense is actual was to be sought for only in the common essence of things or in their classes. The chief stone of office in Aristotle's eyes was that in Plato's theory he considered ideas as transcendent and separate from the things of sense and failed to give through them any explanation of life and change. Not content with this uncritical attitude, he attached more importance to the relation between the individual and the universal. In short the main issue

between them is whether the generic idea, or universal, is abstract or concrete.

This leads us to the question of what substance is. If the universal is not anything subsisting by itself it cannot be substance. It is true that this word is used in various senses but it applies originally to being and not as a predicate to anything else. This condition Aristotle finds fulfilled only in individuals. The universal, as he contended against Plato, does not subsist for itself. Every universal, even the genus, has its existence only in the individual of which it is predicated. It is always in something other than itself. It is not 'this thing'but only a stated condition of things.

The individual one is that which belongs to itself only, which is not borne up by some other, which is what it is by reason of itself, and not upon the basis of other being. Only in a derivative sense can the genera be called substances and they claim a kind of substantial character with the more right the nearer they approach to individual substances, so that the species deserve to be called substances in a higher degree than the genus. To be more exact however, the term substance can only be predicated of individuals, for a class expresses not substance but a condition of substance.

If knowledge is recognition of reality, it must relate, in the first place, to real Being, which is the substance of things. If this substance is individual it follows that in the last resort, all knowledge is of the individual and that individual things furnish not only the starting point but the whole essential content and object of knowledge. This conclusion, however, Aristotle decisively rejects. He says that science relates not to the individual but to the universal, and even when it descends further to particulars it addresses itself all the while not to the individual things as such, but to general conceptions only. We cannot erase this contradiction by the observation that it is only in the realm of natural being that the individual is first, whereas in the realm of spirits the universal is first. To be consistent it would seem as if it were the individual and not as Aristotle taught the universal which should be in its own nature the better known and the more certain. Yet we shall see when we reach Kant that Aristotle by this very thing has made a definite contribution towards the critical philosophy.

The relation of matter to form has manifested itself as the relation of potentiality to actuality. In the movement of potential being into actual being, we have the explicit notion of becoming and thus we have as a supplement to the principle of the

Eleatics in Plato, preserved the principle of Heraclitus. And this we must recognize as an important step towards the subjugation of Platonic dualism. If, as possibility of form, matter is reason in process of becoming, then the antithesis between idea and world of sense, is at least in principle or potentially surmounted, so far as it is one single being, but only on different stages that exhibits itself in both, in matter as well as in form. The relation of the potential to the actual is illustrated by the relation of the raw material to the finished article, of the sleeper to the waker, of the seed to the tree.

The chief distinstion between the system of Aristotle and the system of Plato lies in just this: To Plato the idea as form or actuality tends to be stable, self-subsistent being the opposite of motion and becoming; to Aristotle it is the eternal product of becoming, eternal energy, activity in completed actuality, the goal that is in every instant attained "by the movement of the in itself (potentiality) to the for itself (actuality) not a fabricated and finished being but such as is eternally being produced."

For Aristotle there is no Absolute Not-Being, there is only that which has potentiality not yet having attained actuality. He finds the true rationale of all contingency in the fact that

all finite existence contains the potentiality of being and not-being, and that matter as the indeterminate renders opposite determinations possible.

All inharmonious phenomena are accounted for by this property of resistance in matter. But matter also turns as a magnet striving to reach form as its perfect realization. Pure form is pure actuality. It is the necessary condition of all becoming. It is matter come to be the intelligible essence of a thing. In form the possibility of matter is completely fulfilled so that form and matter can be regarded as differences of condition, not of kind. Pure form is then the real. Many stages can then be distinguished in the coming of mere possibility in determinateness into full actuality or God. There is a hierarchy of forms and all sensible things differ only in their matter.

Yet how we are to define the relation of the particular and individual forms to the highest form, the Diety, Aristotle leaves us quite uncertain. They are given factors just as matter is a given factor. Thus the way is left open for Plotinus to connect the separate links between'heaven and earth'by means of his metaphysical doctrine of emanation.

It may not be improper at this stage of our paper to regard the Platonic philosophy not so much an idealism as an explana-

tionalism, in so far as it calls for explanations without giving them. It simply says we cannot explain the sense world in terms of sense world so the explanation must be found on a higher plane of being. There must be for the world of sense an archtype, a fundamental somewhat that brings the sense world into being. Plato has indeed called for this but it is Plotinus who makes a systematic demonstration of how this can be.

It shall be our aim in making an exposition of Plotinus idealism to grasp the Metaphysical significance of the One and his conception of Matter. We believe that a proper understanding of these two principles constitute an open sesame to his entire philosophy.

The motive of all Plotinus' metaphysics is to be found in the desire to refute materialism and in the conviction that without a unifying principle nothing would exist. To determine what this unifying principle is, is his supreme task, and when found becomes the key to his entire system. Since the connecting link between Mind and Matter is supposed to be in the soul, this is made the starting point in his philosophy proper. "The Metaphysics" appropriates as "given" the results reached in the psychology and with these as a starting point he proceeds by the via dialectica step by step to the primal One, the ground of all being,

life and change.

It may not be amiss, even at this point, to posit the persons of the Neo-Platonic Trinity and later in the discussion to attain gradually to the point from which we started. The Trinity of Plotinus may be said to represent a fusion of three schools of thought. It combines the Pythagorean One and the Aristotelian Intelligence with the Platonic creator. God is the primal One, a principle beyond thought and being; the second hypostasis is the divine Mind or Intelligence regarded as identical with the intelligible world which is its object. The third hypostasis is Soul, the product of Mind. The ideas which it has received from above have become forms, they have taken shape as it were.

But historical as the development of this Trinity may be, it has also a psychological basis. A principle of unity has already been recognized in the soul. It is not absent in natural things but here it is at a lower stage, body having less unity because its parts are locally separate. In soul, however, we cannot rest as the highest term. Particular souls by what they have in common can only be understood as derived from a general soul, which is their cause but is not identical with all or any of them. Again, the general soul falls short of complete unity by being the principle of life and motion to the world which is other than itself.

What it points to as a higher unifying principle is absolutely stable intellect, thinking itself and not the world but containing as identical with its own, the eternal ideas of all the forms general and particular that become explicit in the things of time and space. Even Intellect has a certain duality, because, though intelligence and the intelligible are the same, that which thinks distinguishes itself from the object of thought. Beyond thought is the Absolute Unity which is simply identical with itself. This is other than all being and is the cause of it. It is the good to which all things aspire; for to particular things the greatest unification attainable is the greatest good; and neither the goodness and unity they possess nor their aspirations after a higher degree of it can be explained without positing the Absolute One and the Absolute Good as their source and end.

In this way does Plotinus ascend to the summit of his metaphysics. The proof that the first principle has really been attained must be sought partly in the demonstration of the process by which the whole system of things is derived from it, partly in individual experience. This latter aspect belongs to the mystical side of the doctrine and is not to be had without due preparation. Of the philosophic doctrine itself the method is not mystical. The theory of "emanation" on which it depends is in

reality no more than a very systematic expression of the principle common to Plato and Aristotle that the lower is to be explained by the higher.

The expressed term "emanation" is derived from one of the metaphors by which Plotinus seeks to convey the idea of the production of each order of being from the next above. He compares the cause of all to an overflowing spring which by its excess gives rise to that which comes after it. This similarly produces the next, and so forth, till at length in matter pure indetermination is reached. In all this process however, there is no diemption of the higher principle. God and mind do not disperse themselves in individual souls and in natural things, though these are nowhere cut off from their causes. There is a continual process from first to last, of which the law is the same throughout. Each producing cause remains wholly in its proper seat while that which is produced takes an inferior station. Enn. V, 2, 2. Nothing, however, is separated or cut off from that which is prior to itself. Enn. V, 2, 1. That which is first generated from the One is converted to it and is filled, and was generated looking to it. This is intellect. When it is established about the One, in order that it may see it, then it becomes at once intellect and being. Hence, being in the same manner as the One produces

things similar to itself, through an effusion of abundant power. Its offspring has the form of it, in the same manner as prior to this it likewise flowed forth from the One. And this energy from essence is soul, which was generated from intellect permanently abiding. For intellect also was generated, that which is prior to it abiding. Soul, however, does not produce abiding, but being moved generates an image of itself. Soul, therefore looking thither whence it was generated, is filled. But proceeding into another and contrary motion it generates an image of itself,namely sense and the nature which is in plants. The world Soul is busy with the world of becoming over which it presides. "The ideas which it has received from above have become forms, they have taken shape as it were, though they are not concrete. For Plotinus forms are sensible, they are nearly what we mean by Natural Kinds or Types." The form is still a thought but it is on the point of plunging into material existence. It is the general about to become the particular. At this stage it changes into or evolves the Logos, which is no longer a thought but a power or energy. Thus the Ideas of Intellect, in soul become forms and these in turn give rise to the logos.

This metaphysical theory of emanation is reiterated in various ways. Nothing within the three intelligible principles can

be said to lapse in production; the term being applicable only to the descent of the individual soul. The order throughout, both for the intelligible causes and for the visible universe is a logical order of causation, not an order in time. Strange as it may sound, all the producing causes and their effects in every grade always existed and always will exist. The production by the higher causes has the undeviating character of natural necessity, and is not by voluntary choice and discursive reason, which are secondary results within the world of particulars.

Plotinus himself traces the idea of this causal series to Plato, for whom he says, the Demiurgus is Intellect which is produced by the Good beyond mind and being and in its turn produces soul. Enn. V,1,8. With Aristotle, on the contrary, he does not agree, for though he makes the primal reality separable indeed and intelligible, he nevertheless deprives it of the first rank because it thinks itself. To think itself belongs to Mind but not to the One. Enn.V,1,9.

Plotinus is indeed a man of too great power to lose his self-identity in paying homage to the memory of great names. When he asserts: "As in the nature of things there are three principles, so also with us", he is introducing a new doctrine. Enn. V, 1,10. There is reality in this world of ours, and not a mere semblance.

The virtue and knowledge here are not simply images of archtypes yonder in the intelligible world. If indeed we take the world here not as meaning simply the visible aspect of things, but as including also the soul and what it contains, everything is "here" that is "there". Enn. V, 9,13.

Let us now make a definite examination of how Plotinus characterizes the One and learn by his negative and positive assertions what the One really is, its character and its ultimate worth.

Above all else it is obvious that the One cannot be all things, since in that case it would be no longer One. What differentiates it from Intellect in this particular is that this thinks itself as the whole world of real existences. Its variety falls far short of unity. The One cannot consequently be Intellect nor can it be existence for existence is all things.

The One is not something but is prior to everything. The nature of the One being the creator of all things, it itself is no one of them. So it is not a thing, nor quality, nor quantity, nor intellect, nor soul, nor in motion nor at rest, nor in space nor in time, but in the absolutely "monoform" or rather formless, prior to all form, prior to motion and prior to rest. For these things pertain to existence and it creates them in their multiplicity.

The reason for the difficulty we have of comprehending the One is due to the inability of the understanding to proceed except by concepts, and a concept is a multiple affair and the soul misses the One when she falls into number and plurality. In order to comprehend the One the soul must pass beyond understanding and nowhere emerges from her unity.

"If we now ask in what sense is the One one and how it is to be grasped by our thought, I reply it must be regarded as more one than monad or point." The One is found neither in other things nor in the divisible, nor is it indivisible in the sense in which the smallest possible remainder is indivisible. It is the greatest of all things not in extension but in power and hence space and extension have nothing to do with its power. It exists in itself and has no attributes.

The unity of God can be expressed through the concept of self-sufficiency. For he is the sufficient and free from want of all things, whereas everything which is multiple and not one wants, since it has been made of many things and its essence stands in need of unity. But the One does not stand in need of itself since it is itself.

Furthermore, the source does not need the things which follow after it and the source of all things has no need of any. For

what wants, wants in the sense that it strives after its source. Again, if the One is seeking anything it is clearly not to be One and hence needs its own destruction as One.

If we ask how the One became conscious or begets Intelligence, His Image, Plotinus would answer: 'By turning himself to himself he began to see and this seeing is Intelligence. The One is the power of all things. Intelligence separates itself, as it were, from the power and sees its effects. In some mystic way, by turning itself to itself yet without moving, the One became conscious, the Intelligence was filled with Ideas, the Soul with Forms, the Words shot forth to quicken matter and the great stream of life began. Each looked up to the cause above it, to the light of the abiding Sun, and drank in life, meaning, power according to the measure of its capacity.'

It will doubtless appear at this stage of our paper that in Neo-Platonism as a system there is hardly a single idea that does not flow in a straight line from the dialogues of Plato himself. The change that has come over Platonism is in regard to its two main articles- the doctrine of God and the doctrine of the Ideas.

Thus far, true to the attitude of our philosopher himself, we have said but little of the external world. Like all Greek Idealists, Plotinus drew a very sharp distinction between the

world of Sense and the World of Intelligence. The world of sense is in itself mainfold, imperfect, half-real and therefore imperfectly Knowable. It is marked-

1. By Multiplicity. What if offers to us is an interminable host of sensations, of sight, sound, taste, touch and smell. These we can in no way grasp or understand till we have reduced them to order. We observe their recurrence in more or less fixed combinations, we gather them into groups and these again into still larger groups. We generalize, we unify; and in proportion as we succeed in laying hold of a principle of unity we begin to Know. The unity is in the things themselves. "All things that are, are because they are one. There could be no army, no chorus, no flock of sheep if each were not one; no house, no ship; for if the house or the ship loses its unity, it is no longer a house or a ship. But in a higher sense it is in mind. It is imparted to the things by the Divine Mind, and we perceive it because our minds are akin to the Divine."

2. By change. The Platonist had learned from Heracleitus that all things flow as a stream of water. "You cannot step twice into the same river." God alone can say, "I am". Everything we see is like a drifting cloud, before you can point your finger at it, it has taken a different shape. Perpetual mutabil-

ity is the law of life;"peace", says Heracleitus "belongs only to the dead." From this again it follows that the sensible world cannot in itself be known. For knowledge is enduring, and its object must endure also.

3. By Strife. Here again Heracleitus taught the Platonist that the condition of existence is the ceaseless play of antagonisms. Life begets death, and death life. "War", says Heracleitus, is the father of all things, and the king of all", and on this ground he found fault with Homer for praying "that strife might perish from among gods and men." In the philosopher's judgment the poet had unwittingly cursed the world, "for all things are the children of strife." This idea was a common place among the Platonists. They were not dismayed so much by the apparent harshness of the worlds'-march, by the laws of life in death, of competition and survival of the fittest. Whatever is lawful seemed to admit of some kind of explanation, though not a wholly satisfactory one. The main difficulties they found in lawlessness, in imperfection of type and above all, with moral evil. Everywhere in the sensible world they discerned traces of inadequacy, a weakening of the ideal, as in a picture that only partially realizes the artist's conception. But the power to recognize imperfection depends on the knowledge of the perfect. It

is by the law that we condemn the lawless. Now law, says Plotinus, does not make lawlessness, neither does lawlessness make law. Disorder is due to the fact that order is superimposed by a higher intelligence upon things or creatures, that are for some reason or other imperfectly receptive of it. Here again then the sensible world cannot be understood in itself. We must look to the ideal of which it is the image, the shadow; and we claim to possess this ideal by the very fact that we can venture to pass judgment on the deficiencies of the shadow.

4. By Necessity. Here everything is bound in the iron chain of causality. Everything has a cause; the cause is outside it, and yet determines its nature. Even man himself so far as he is animal, is not free. His reasonings depend on sensations, and these on external objects. His will is limited by circumstances; even his virtues are called into existence by the nature of the peculiar difficulties with which he had to contend. Nevertheless, an universal, and therefore true, belief tells him that he is free. Where then is freedom to be found? Not in this material contingent world, where all depends on something else, but in the realm of thought. Thought is cause and not effect, determined only by the laws of truth and goodness, it is therefore self-determined, therefore free. Thus again we are led to believe

in the existence of another world higher and better than the world of sense.

From these considerations it follows that the world we live in is a world of half reality, a world of becoming, not of being, apprehended by opinion, not by true knowledge. The facts of sense which we think most certain are really least certain. Plato has expressed this well in the Republic by the famous allegory of the men in the Cave. The favorite simile of Plotinus is that of St. Paul. The world is like a mirror, in which a man sees shadows of realities. "Only", he adds,"you see the mirror, and you do not see matter."

If we look closely at the world of sense, we discover that it is a combination of two factors (I) Matter and (II) Qualities.

It is important at this point to note what Plotinus' conception of matter really is. It is not what we mean by material or stuff. What he has really done is to clear the idealist use of the word from any sort of ambiguity. Strip off from any finite existence all attributes of every kind; take away from it color, taste, smell, warmth, texture, solidty, shape, extension and the residuum is matter. The metaphysical necessity of such a residuum was established partly by appeal to the universal belief of the schools, partly by the scientific maxim that nothing

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can come out of nothing. Suppose a case of complete change such as that of a grub into a butterfly. There has been complete alteration, yet no death, no breach of continuity. Something has persisted; the Form has been entirely renewed, but the Matter subsists uneffected.

For this reason, Matter is called the nurse, receptacle, vehicle, substratum of the Form. "Matter does not become the form nor does it acquire qualities by union with the Form." It is merely the principle of the Form's cohesion, the condition of its manifestation. "It receives shape but is not shaped." It remains always what it was, absolutely undefined. To the Greek, matter is immaterial; it has no body. In the world of sense there is none such, for even the planet is corporeal, corporeal in so far as it has form.

It cannot be said either to exist or not to exist. Actually it is nothing, potentially if it be joined to Form, it is all things. Its existence is a future, a promise of being. Matter is not nothing (οὐκ ὄν) but No Thing (μὴ ὄν). Is thinking about matter then the same as thinking about Nothing? No; when we think about Nothing the mind is blank, but when we think about Matter we have a kind of impression of the shapeless. For this reason Plato said we conceived of it by a "bastard reasoning."

Platonism inevitably issues in a dualism. Matter is distinguished from God and therefore limits God both physically and morally. This explains why the Platonist was so anxious to reduce the conception of matter to the lowest possible term, why he ascribed to it a mere hypothetical existence. If he could show that matter was all but nothing he could show that God was all but Almighty. He narrowed the gulf to a mere chink but could not close it altogether.

To return to the qualities, one of the most important conclusions that Plotinus reached was that they fell into two classes, those which are complementary to the existence of a thing and those which are merely accidental. The really important qualities are the complementary, those which belong to a particular thing, which make it what it is and with the matter constitute its sensible existence. These qualities are accounted for by regarding them as the energies of a Logos by which an individual object is made. It thus becomes clear why the Word or Logos is so often called "spermatic", because to make use of an analogy, it is like the seed which carries implicit within itself all the properties of the developed plant. It will be gathered from what has been said that Idea, Form, and Logos belong properly to the works of God and that their common function is to bring down life:

They operate in the world at large. The effect is always a symbol of the cause, the thing of the mind that called it into being.

Thus we arrive at the idealist position as first distinctly formulated by the great Neo-Platonist. The external world is none other than the thought of God transmuted into vital law. What we recognize in nature are the traces, imitations or shadows of intelligence. The modern way of expressing the same view is that there is no object without a subject, no thing without a thinker. Nothing can exist, be known or brought into definite relation with other things but by an ordering reason.

There still remains for consideration two important phenomena of the sensible world, which we call Space and Time.

The same general considerations that rule all the conditions of sensible existence, apply here also. Space and Time are half real because they are the shadows of realities. It is with them as with all qualities. Color does not belong to the idea, yet there is something in the idea which ultimately produces color. It is just the same with space and time.

Perhaps the most instructive passage on the subject is Ennead VI, 8, 11. "The whole difficulty that besets us in the consideration of the world of sense arises from our first assuming Space, as a kind of chaos, and then, when we have set up this notion of

Space in our imagination bringing God into it. Then when we have brought Him in, we begin to ask whence and how did he come, and as if he were a new arrival, we have been wondering how He got there and what He is, as if he had suddenly emerged from some abyss, or dropped down from the clouds. It is needful then to cut away the cause of all this perplexity and cast Space away altogether from our thought of Him, and not suppose that He is in anything, or lies or is seated in anything, or that He 'came' at all, but just that He is, as He is, and as reason proves Him to be, and that Space, like everything else, is after Him, that space indeed is after everything else."

Space, like everything else in Plotinus' metaphysical pyramid, is explained by the general doctrine of causality. The effect is always in the cause. Everything is in that which precedes it; all therefore is in Mind which is in God who is in nothing and therefore is everywhere and nowhere.

We commonly speak of the world as "in space". According to the Neo-Platonist, space is in the world and nowhere else. Space in fact is extension. If bodies are limited by space, they are limited by their own space or shape; the limit is from within and not from without. Thus space, place, room, bulk are only different names for the same property of corporeal existence. It is in

the body or rather about the body and this distinction really shows us what is really meant by "in". For instance the wine is surrounded by the pitcher but it is not in in the same sense in which a thought is "in" the mind, as a part which implies the whole, and is interpenetrated by every other part, as an energy of the undivided life.

Thus space turns out to be a mere mode of earthly existence, a rough similitude of the true spiritual existence. Carefully interrogated, the little word "in" will lead us up from things "here" to things "yonder". From the materialized ideas flattened out into length and breath so as to become visible, we can rise to the conception of the same ideas as they exist, one in all and all in one in the Divine Mind.

It is the same with Time to the treatment of which a special book of the Enneads (III, 7) is devoted.

Time is there set over against Eternity and its counterpart but not as its contradictory. They are not distinguished as finite and infinite. Time is not a piece snipped off from Eternity and measured out. It is just as eternal in the vulgar sense of the word as Eternity itself. It is "an image of Eternity"- Eternity made visible.

For the Divine Mind, regarded as the second hypostasis, there

is no past or future, all is in the present. In such an Intelligence there will be sameness and yet difference, rest and yet movement. We can perhaps best grasp the idea by the analogy of a geometer who is complete master of his science. He may be said to hold the whole articulated system in a synthetic unity. So in the Divine Intelligence we find unity in divinity, it is One Many and Eternity is its property, its nature.

In the third hypostasis or the Divine Soul, the unity is weakened and the diversity is increased. It is no longer One Many, but One and Many. Reason has taken the place of contemplation and creation has begun. It is here that Time begins. It is born of the soul and does not exist out of the soul. Time in brief is the property of the lower life as Eternity is of the higher. The two stand in the relation of cause and effect, of substance and shadow.

Thus while Space is a fact of sensible existence, Time is purely subjective. Both may be called laws of thought but only of the lower regions of thought.

From this brief account it can readily be seen how severely scientific the system of Plotinus is. It is worked out with a single purpose on true idealist lines and issues in a unity as complete as is attainable by the mind of man. The principle he

has reached in the conception of the One provides for a unifying principle which is at the same time the source of all organic life. By means of it he has advanced an enduring argument against materialism and rivalled even the Gospels in bringing life and immortality to light.

Whether or not Kant was familiar with the philosophy of Plotinus is probably an open question, but it has seemed of interest and value to gain an insight into the latest product of Greek thought.

To my mind the relation of Kant to the moderns is more pronounced than is his relation to Plato and Aristotle; though it is out of the latter that most of their various theories ultimately, directly or indirectly, took their rise. It is for this reason that we have assigned so much space to the Greeks. We have already shown how Plato and Aristotle each in his own way sought to overcome the dualism between form and matter and to explain in their theory of knowledge the relation of the particular to the universal.

To bring to a point the main issue between these men it must be said that for Plato the generic idea tends to be abstract, for Aristotle it is concrete and exists only in commixture with the individuals.

"Kant, like Aristotle, though restricting the question of the processes of human cognition instead of leaving it as Plato and Aristotle did to the wide field of universal being, holds to an inseparable union of the concept with the percept- no concept without a filling of percepts, no percepts except as united into objects and a cosmic system by concepts: 'Concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind.' All our universal judgments, the results of our faculty of understanding a priori, are according to Kant, in accord with Aristotle, restricted to the particulars given by our sense perception. But in the larger function of our reason, in which it deals with what Kant names the Ideas, or Rational Ideals, namely, the Soul, the World- whole and God, Kant sides with Plato rather than with Aristotle, holding to the existence of a world of absolute or metaphysical realities corresponding to these Ideas, but reached by the Practical Reason, not by the Theoretical, the objects of our unswerving fealty in response to the consciousness of duty, instead of being the perceived objects of our theorizing and depicting powers."

The next philosopher who is of interest to us in connection with our problem is Decartes, by virtue of whose originality of conception, singular depth and concentration of thought is right-

ly regarded as the founder of modern philosophy.

His fundamental principle is that all certitude starts from the point of self-certitude and Kant makes this critically exact in his own doctrines, that the basis of all synthesis lies in the original "synthetic unity of self-consciousness", so too, in a way, does he reproduce the Cartesian parallelism between consciousness and matter in his own parallelism between the physic and the physical; the contrast between the external things in space and the internal experiences of the mind in time.

So far Kant accepts Descartes epistemology but he attacks the doctrine that the ground of the concomitance of mind and matter is in a third, and strictly the only substance, God, distinct from both; on the contrary he places this bond of concomitance between the external series of things and the internal series of mental states in the unity of the self which perceives by means of the spontaneous media, time and space and the synthesis between these which this union necessitates.

"In thus attacking this fundamental principle of Decartes for the unification of things, Kant carries the cardinal points that are consequent upon it- the double meaning of substance brought about in making God by his definition the only Substance and then deriving bodily substance and thinking substance as

creatures of God, the fantasy of a professedly real world of matter that yet is unperceived and unperceivable for he holds that which has extension cannot project itself on that which has not and vice- versa, the dogma of the 'forcible collocation' of soul and body and the apparently inconsistent attitude of asserting the freedom of the mind, through its intelligence, while it is kept in existence by being recreated of God from moment to moment. Kant maintained that on the basis of these doctrines the required certainty of a predictive science of nature would be impossible, as well as the essential antonomy of the moral life."

Finally, since Descartes rests the reality of matter on the mind's assurance of the veracity of God, without at the same time giving an adequate proof of God's existence, it is left an open question what the relation between mind and matter really is.

As with all the great idealists before Kant, the philosopher of Köngsberg lays Leibnitz under tribute also and then proceeds, from the deep springs of his own mind to supplement his limitations as each in turn before had contributed his part towards making more definite and explicit what the problems and solutions of philosophy respectively are.

With regard to Leibnitz, Kant accepts his principle of the

internal spontaneity of the rational self-consciousness, the cognizing ego or individual self. But he rejects the Leibnitzian notion of the mere monad, the self as a simple metaphysical point. According to Kant the nature of the self is not a unity primordially simple but a unity "originally" synthetic, that is, complex-spontaneously filled with contents a priori.

On the theory of Knowledge the consequences of the Monadology have a very important bearing. In the development of this theory Leibnitz seeks to avoid the empiricism of Locke on the one hand and the ontology of Spinoza on the other. He is consequently led to defend the notion of innate ideas on the ground not that they are supposed to be explicitly and consciously but implicitly and potentially contained in the soul. The usual contrast between rational and empirical Knowledge shrinks for Leibnitz into the graduated difference of lesser and more distinctness. Among the innate theoretical ideas, two, as principles of all cognition and of all reasoning, occupy for Leibnitz the first rank,- the proposition of contradiction and the proposition of sufficient reason. To these as a proposition of the second rank he adds the principium indiscernibilium,or the proposition that there are not in nature two things perfectly alike.

Significant as these new principles at first seem in the

endeavor to construct an epistemology on an idealistic basis Kant shows conclusively that Leibnitz misused them by confusing the transcendental use of the understanding with the empirical. He intellectualized phenomena by tracing bodies back to intelligible things (monads) and created his ontology for these. This is the common source of Leibnitz errors. Such a system may be suitable for intelligble things but not for sensible things to which he nevertheless applied them. For instance, to take the principium contradictionis; in the conceptual world real determinations are not annulled. In that sphere only logical contradiction nullifies. But in the perceptual world there are real determinations that are cancelled which do not involve a logical contradiction, e. g., two moving forces which act upon a certain point in opposite directions. So too with the principle of the identitas indiscernibilium. To be sure, in the conceptual world two completely similar things are identical. There cannot be two concepts with the same content. But that does not prevent two things in the conceptual world from being completely similar without coinciding. Lastly the monadological treatment of space and time are subjected to criticism, Kant denying that extension and duration arise from obscure thinking for this would reduce the world of perception to an illusion disappearing before clari-

fied thought.

In the relation of Kant to Berkeley, the author of the Critique expressed his position in contrast to that of the English bishop even more strongly than there was real occasion for. In the first review of his book he had been classed as a subjective idealist of the Berkeleyian school. Kant did not want to have anything at all in common with Berkeley. Yet as was the case with Descartes and Leibnitz, Kant does hold to the main point, though only in a limited degree,namely, that the material world has no substantial reality, no existence as a 'thing in itself', it is indeed as Berkeley taught, a thing 'in the mind' a peculiar system of experiences, but not in the loose undiscriminating sense which Berkeley supposed it. "According to Kant he is led into positive error through confounding the external with the internal world of experience, in neglecting to distinguish space from time and thus ending in a denial of outness altogether. Thus for him, the world became a mere broken series of our internal sensation or feelings. This inadequate explanation was supplemented by Kant in his doctrine of the co-ordinate a priority of the two elements of pure reason, space and time mutually independent, arising from the spontaneous unity of the self and thus supplying an essential and permanent contrast between the world of ob-

jects and the world of concomitant mental states. Further instead of seeking the ground of concomitance between mind and nature in the eternal conceptions of a supposed divine mind after the manner of Descartes, Kant finds it in the self-conscious unity of the perceiving self, thus bringing into philosophy the fertile conception of shifting the ground of the unity of things and of experiences from a theocentric to an anthropocentic basis. To Kant,Berkeley's passage from the field of empirical experience to the changeless continuity of the divine conception is unwarranted by any principle which his scheme of explanation demands- it is a purely gratuitous assumption, a sort of deus ex machina without which he is unable to make out his case."

Berkeley's view ends in the complete denial of any external world,yet this externality,this existence in space as contrasted with existence merely in Time is the essential condition of the physical world. Thus Berkeley's professed world becomes an illusion,as thoroughly "visionary", its author teaching as a dogma the bare ideality or empirical subjectivity of nature."

The motive for Kant's equivocal Refutation of Idealism has its source in his purpose to lay down the Postulates of Empirical thought. The material idealism of Descartes and Bishop Berkeley, unless refuted in a direct obstacle to the possibility of carry-

ing out this intent. According to the statement of Kant, the problematic idealism of Descartes declares the existence of objects in space without us as doubtful only and not demonstrable, while the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley states that it is false and impossible.

Kant's aim is to prove that the rules in the Analytic for proving existence mediately are not validly impugned by the theories of Descartes or Berkeley, that even our internal experience is possible only under the supposition of external experience, or in other words the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things.

The refutation is directed directly against Descartes and only indirectly against Berkeley, the latter being the pronounced disciple of the former, neither of whom held that mind has any objective knowledge of a world of matter but that our ideas of external things are not derived from them but from a spirit superior to ourselves.

The thesis to be established is that the "mere consciousness in experience of my own determinate existence proves the existence of determinate objects in space outside me." The proof begins with the statement that is granted by the Idealist and every-

body else, namely, that I am conscious of having a series of mental states. Then follows the proof itself which contains the following steps: (1) The consciousness of time as determinate can only be accounted for on the supposition that something is known as permanent; (2) This permanent cannot be found in my mental states themselves, for the permanent is not the mere idea of the permanent, and hence it must be bound up with the consciousness of external things; (3) Consequently the consciousness of my mental states as internal, necessarily implies the consciousness of things in space as external. Let us take these steps in order. (1) All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. Kant gives no proof of this assertion in the Refutation doubtless because he had proved it at length in the first analogy of experience. It is enough to say here that if we eliminate the permanent altogether we cannot conceive how there should be a consciousness of time as present, past and future, since time is the mere form of perception of which we cannot become conscious except in relation to the particulars of sense.

Now (2) "this permanent cannot be anything in me because the only way in which my existence in time can be determined is through this permanent. Hence the perception of this permanent

is possible only through a thing outside me and not through a mere idea of a thing outside me." A strong contrast is drawn between (a) a "permanent in me" which is equivalent to the idea of a thing outside me",and (b) the permanent as a "thing outside me." The gist of his argument lies in just this,that a "permanent in me" is a "mere idea" or subjective state and this is the only permanent that the psychological Idealist is entitled to speak of.

In the remarks appended to the Refutation, he points out that the mere "I" of consciousness must not be identified with the "I" as determinate, because the self as determinate is in time, and therefore the object of inner perception; and again that the "I" is destitute of even the least determinateness,and hence cannot supply the permanent required as "correlate of the determination of time." In other words, the pure "I" is not a permanent in time, and therefore not a permanent in contrast to which we can become conscious of the self as in time or of time as determinate. The permanent therefore which we require is a permanent in time. But there is no permanent in time except the permanent in space, since mere ideas have no permanence in themselves, and the pure "I" as the mere abstraction or relation to consciousness, is not in time at all. If there were no permanent

in space, but only the idea of the permanent in space, there could be no consciousness of time as determinate since an idea is itself a mere transient state. The permanent is therefore not in me or is not a mere idea of a thing outside of me;it is a thing outside of me, i. e. in space.

The idealist whom Kant is refuting is therefore compelled to admit that the permanent is not outside consciousness but only outside of a mere series of mental states; in other words, external phenomena are known as directly as internal phenomena. Thus the opposition of mere ideas to things outside consciousness is transformed into the relative distinction of internal events and external things both alike being in Kantian language phenomena, and not the one a phenomena and the other a thing in itself as the Cartesian idealist might say; or the internal events real and external things non-entities as the Berkeleyian idealist might say.

Thus, in brief, have we unfolded the exact purpose, meaning and argument of the 'Refutation of Idealism' and the refutation of the charge of Idealism in the Prolegomena,a book written professedly to expound the First Edition, is in its attitude on this question completely that of the Second Edition.

Material Idealism as defined in the Prolegomena consists in

the assertion that there are none but thinking beings,all other things, which we think are perceived in intuition,being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them belongs in fact. Whereas, in contrast to this doctrine he declares that things as objects of our senses existing without us are given, but we know nothing of what they may be in themselves, knowing only their phenomena, that is, the representations which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Consequently he grants by all means, that there are bodies without us,that is,things which are quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the representations which their influence on our sensibility procures us,and which we call bodies, a term signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is unknown to us but not therefore less actual. The critical idealism which Kant is advancing,he regards as the proper antidote against the visionary idealism of Berkeley and does not concern the existence of things in space (the doubting of which however constitutes idealism in the ordinary sense) since it never occurred to him to doubt them, but it concerns the senuous representations of things to which space and time especially belong.

To quote Prof. Watson: "The Refutation of Idealism differs from the Prolegomena simply in omitting any reference to things

in themselves and in containing a complete proof of the correlation of external and internal phenomena instead of a mere assertion of their correlativity."

The most careful and thorough investigation to be found on this subject is Vaihinger's "Refutation des Idealismus". In this review he traces the history of debate on the problem and shows the evolution of Kant's thought as manifested by his positive yet vacillating attitude in the first and second editions of the Critique. Since our purpose is to learn the significance of the Refutation rather than to give the history of the problem, it will suffice to give the conclusions which the Kantian scholar has himself reached.

"From Kant's own statement there result two lines of thought unclear throughout which flow into each other. The traditional exposition is that, according to which, the external world is a mere representation. It is that view which Fisher stood for and from out of which the Refutation of Idealism is developed as it is set forth in the Second Edition, (apparently completely different from the first edition) and so far it is an inconsistency on the part of Kant; for according to the first edition, no material world can exist independent of our ideas. But the subsequent conception which in this case is stood for by Arnoldt, is that, ac-

cording to which, the material external world, certainly exists independent of our idea, but only outside our common empirical ideas; in behalf of this conception, the Refutation of Idealism is throughout made in the spirit of genuine Kantianism. Strictly speaking neither of these positions can be held alone for in Kant both conceptions are to be found at the same time and near each other. For this very reason there arises an endless lack of clearness in the Critique of Pure Reason. Neither has Kant been able to extricate himself from this labyrinth."

"The Refutation of Idealism in the Second Edition does not refer to the ding au sich but to the existence of objects in space, but the fuller comment to the same in the preface of the Second Edition does contain a perplexing reference to the ding an sich."

"It is not aimed against Berkeley but directly against Descartes, it does however concern Berkeley's idealism indirectly."

"As a Refutation of Idealism it does not stand, as such, in opposition to the first edition but in harmony with it; it does however emphasize more strongly the realistic side of the Kantian doctrine than the first edition."

"In each of the two editions of the Critique are two oppos-

ing conceptions about the condition of the material external world, in relation to our ideas, entertained; according to the one, the corporeal world is a mere representation (Vorstellungen) according to the other, it is something independent of the empirical representation. According to the first conception Kant stands in the relation to the corporeal world on the standpoint of the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, according to the other he must refute the same as false."

"The recognition of a corporeal world in space independent of our empirical representation is a necessary and peremptory logical consequence of Kant's fundamental position. This consequence has Kant also drawn."

"Through the actually made assumption by Kant of an affection of the mind through the objects in space, logically connected with this consequence arises a self-contradiction in the Kantian system which destroys it from within out."

"As we approach the necessity of discussing in some measure the critical philosophy, the significance of the scope and intensity of the work seem well nigh appalling to one called upon to perform such a task, but since it must be done the categorical imperative shall have its own way in so far as the agent is capable of fulfilling the duty thus imposed.

After working through the history of philosophy Kant finally faced the dilemma either of being obliged to accept the dogmatism of the old metaphics or the radical skepticism of the English school. "It was", he observes, "the suggestion of David Hume which first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction. I first tried whether Hume's objection could not be put into a general form and soon found that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only one by which the understanding thinks the connection of things a priori. I sought to make certain of the number of such connections, and when I had succeeded in this, by starting from a single principle I proceeded to the deduction of these concepts which I was now certain were not reduced from experience, as Hume had apprehended but sprang from the pure understanding."

If, therefore, we divide systems of philosophy into <u>rational</u> and <u>empirical</u> according as they lay stress on the a priori concepts and principles of the pure understanding or on the a posteriori impressions and associations of the empirical faculties, we may describe Kant as dissatisfied with the rational philosophy because it exaggerated the a priori, and with the empirical philosophy because it exaggerated the a posteriori elements of

knowledge. Consequently, he sets himself the task of examining or critizing all knowledge for the purpose of determining or, as he says, "deducing", the a priori concepts or forms of thought. And if it is the task of philosophy to answer the questions, What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? Kant considers that the answer to the second and third questions depend on the answers given to the first. His philosophy is therefore a transcendental criticism, that is, an examination of knowledge for the purpose of determining the a priori elements which are the conditions of knowledge and which we cannot know by mere experience.

Division of Philosophy: Kant, as is well known, first devoted his attention to the transcendental criticism of pure reason, and afterwards took up the transcendental criticism of practical reason. In the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason he distinguished the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental logic and subdivides the latter into transcendental analytic and transcendental dialectic.

Transcendental Aesthetic is defined as the "science of all the principles of sensibility a priori" or the inquiry into the a priori conditions of sensation. Now, our external senses represent their objects as extended in space, and our internal

senses represent our conscious states as succeeding each other in time. Space and time are the a priori conditions of external and internal sensation,- conditions or forms which make sensation possible. They are, therefore, anterior to all experience. Space and time are not as is commonly supposed, empirical concepts derived from experience; their a priori character appears from the very fact that knowledge based on the nature of space and time (mathematical knowledge) is necessary and universal; for it is a primary postulate of all Kant's transcendtal inquiry that nothing which is necessary and universal can come from experience. Space and time are not properties of things; they belong to the subject, inhere in the subject, and are, so to speak, part of the subjective world. Their rôle is to reduce the multiplicity of the object to that unity which is an essential condition of being perceived by the subject, which is one. They are the conditions of of sensitive intuition and have no objective reality, except in so far as they are applied to real things in the act of perception. "Space and time are the pure forms of our intuition, while sensation forms its matter."

Having discussed space and time the transcendental aesthetic is at an end: it is now ascertained what is a priori in sense. The manner in which the mind receives objects and applies to them

its own spontaneity as it embraces them in its intelligible forms and strives to think them by means of its notions constitutes our next problem. The investigation of these a priori notions or forms of thought like the forms of space and time in the sensible faculty is the object of the transcendental analytic.

These a priori forms of the pure understanding which stand to intellectual knowledge in the relation in which space and time stand to sense knowledge, Kant calls the categories. It will be well to consider: (a) the existence of the categories; (b) the construction of the table of categories; (c) the nature of the categories; and (d) the objective value of the categories.

a. The existence of the categories: Since all intuitions are sensuous and the understanding is a supersensible faculty it becomes evident that the concepts which belong to the understanding are not immediately referred to an object, but to some other representation, that is to an intuition or to another concept. All the acts of the understanding may therefore be reduced to judgments. These may be contingent and particular or they may be necessary and universal. But (and this is the fundamental assumption in Kant's Critique) what is necessary and universal in our knowledge is a priori. Therefore, there is in our knowledge of necessary and universal propositions an a priori element, and this

is the form or category.

b. Construction of the table of categories. Kant considers that the failure of Aristotle to construct an adequate table of categories was due to his taking them empirically as they came to hand instead of deriving them from a common principle. Kant therefore proceeds not with the analysis of being but with the analysis of thought. He makes this examination by means of ordinary logic. On the different kinds of relation which exist between subject and predicate he bases his construction of the table of categories. These relations kant reduces to twelve; to which therefore, correspond the twelve categories.

Kinds of Judgment.	Categories.
I. Quantity:	
Universal	Unity
Particular	Plurality
Singular	Totality
II. Quality:	
Affirmative	Reality
Negative	Negation
Infinite	Limitation
III. Relation:	
Categorical	Subsistence and Inherence
Hypothetical	Causality and Dependence
Disjunctive	Reciprocity (Active and Passive)
IV. Modality:	
Problematical	Possibility- Impossibility
Assertory	Esistence- Non-Existence
Apodeictic	Necessity- Contingency

c. The nature of the categories: These notions or a priori forms are not full fledged ideas such as Plato attributed to the soul in its prenatal existence nor are they like the Leibnitzian monad possessed of mere subjective dispositions or capabilities to be evolved into actuality in the process of ideation. On the contrary they are the empty forms of intellectual knowledge all the contents of which are derived from experience.

The nature of the categories is best understood by a study of their function. Since all knowledge whether sensuous or intellectual is conditioned by unity, Kant asks: "How should we a priori have arrived at such a synthetic unity if the subjective grounds of such unity were not contained a priori in the original sources of all our knowledge?" We have seen that the a priori forms which effect the requisite unity in the case of sense knowledge are time and space. The function of the categories is entirely similar: to effect the requisite unity in the case of intellectual knowledge- to snythesize the manifold of experience. And here we arrive at a second question- How does this take place? How are objects subsumed under the empty intelligible forms and so made for the first time properly objects?

This subsumption would have no difficulty if objects and notions were homogeneous. But they are not so. The objects as

coming into the mind through sense are of a sensuous nature. The question is then, how can sensible objects be subsumed under intelligible notions? how can the categories be applied to objects? The a priori forms must be brought down to the empirical contents anteriorly to experience; for they render empirical knowledge possible. Kant is therefore obliged to have recourse to the doctrine of schematism. The schemata are the work of the synthetic imagination, and mediate between the a priori form and the manifold of experience. Thus, "the transcendental determination of time (which is the principal schema) is so far homogeneous with the category that it is general and founded on a rule a priori; and it is, on the other hand, so far homogeneous with the phenomenon that time must be contained in every empirical representation of the manifold." From the fundamental schema which is time are derived as many schemata as there are categories.

The unification of the manifold in perception which constitutes the essence of empirical knowledge presupposes (1) the application of the forms of space and time resulting in sense intuition; (2) this a priori function further presupposes the reproductive synthesis of the imagination; (3) there is the a priori form or category which is the prime and absolute condition of all objective knowledge, and finally above all there is the

unity of self-consciousness.

The doctrine of the function of the categories is well summed up in the formula "percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty." With regard to the schematism of our understanding applied to phenomena and their mere form, it may be well for us to content ourselves with Kant's saying that such schematism is an art hidden in the depth of the human soul, the true sense of which we shall hardly ever be able to understand.

d. The objective value of the categories: Kant uses the term objective to characterize judgments that are universal and necessary. The total problem of his supposed science, Kritik, is to determine how this can be, or in other words: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? In judgments which are merely analytical we remain within the given concept, while predicating something of it; but in judgments which are synthetic we go beyond the concept, in order to bring something together with it which is wholly different from what is contained in it. It is therefore by means of synthetic a priori judgments that we make progress in our intellectual knowledge of reality, and since the categories are the a priori elements of such judgments, the elements which confer necessity and universality on them, thereby

making them to be scientific, it is evident that it is the categories that render intellectual knowledge possible. Without the categories the objects of intellectual knowledge would be given in experience but not known.

Although the categories are a priori they do not extend our knowledge beyond phenomena; they do not lead to a nowmenal knowledge of that which is given in sensation. "The understanding a priori can never do more than anticipate the form of a possible experience; and as nothing can be an object of experience except the phenomenon, it follows that the understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility. As phenomena are nothing but representations, the understanding refers them to a something as the object of our sensuous intuition. This means a something equal to X, of which we do not, nay, with the present constitution of our understanding can not know anything." This something is the nowmenon, the transcendental object, the thing in itself (Ding an sich).

Transcendental Dialectic: As the task of the Aesthetic was to discover the pure percepts of time and space and so reduce the external world to phenomena, and as the purpose of the Analytic was to list the categories at the root of the understanding, so too in order to complete the examination of the principles

whereby we think it possible to know, the Dialectic must have for its object the examination or criticism of the ideas. These are forms less general than the categories, elements of reasoning rather than of judgment serving to unify the manifold of intellectual experience, just as the categories and space and time serve to unify the manifold of sense representation and impression. Now just as the form of judgment furnished us with a basis for the system of categories, so the forms of inference serve as a basis for the enumeration of the ideas. To the three forms of syllogistic reasoning, namely categorical, by pothetical and disjunctive, correspond, by the subtle artifice of Kant, the three ideas of the reasoning faculty, namely the idea of the soul, or thinking subject, the idea of matter, or the totality of phenomena, and the idea of God, the supreme condition of all possibility. Reason being immanent, that is, having no direct relation to objects. these three ideas, the psychological, the cosmological and the theological should remain immanent. The attempt of the old metaphysics based on scholastic realism to establish them as existing outside the mind must necessarily lead to an entanglement of contradiction, and it is the aim of the transcendental philosophy to expose these contradictions and so dispel the transcendental illusion, which has vitiated every system of psy-

chology, cosmology and theology.

In the psychological ideas reason commits a simple paralogism (the paralogisms of pure reason): in the cosmological ideas it is the fate of reason to find itself compelled to make contradictory assertions (the antinomies): and in the theological ideas reason is occupied with a void ideal (the ideal of pure reason).

(1). The Rational Psychology.

The exigencies of both time and space coerce us into the necessity of dealing briefly with the 'Ideas'. But to begin with the psychological, Kant points out conclusively that the ordinary conceptions of the soul all alike are petitiones principii in that they are without exception derived from the simple 'I think', but the 'I think' is neither perception nor notion, it is a mere consciousness, an act of the mind which attends, unites, supports all perceptions and notions. This act of thought now is falsely converted into a thing; for the ego as subject, the existence of an ego as object, as soul is substituted. To be able to treat the ego as an object and apply categories in its regard, it would have required to have been empirically given in perception which is impossible.

The outcome of Kant's dialectic over the paralogism here in-

volved bears a striking correspondence with the result that Hume reached in his Treatise on the Understanding. The soul is simply outside the range of possible experience and no amount of speculation can adequately define it. Kant consequently dismisses the subject by relegating the soul to the realm of the Practical Reason.

(2). The Rational Cosmology.

The Critique of rational cosmology entitled "The Antimony of Pure Reason" occupies the second main division of the Dialectic.

The real point of departure for the discussion is the problem of infinity. This is the burden of the first set of antimonies. (1) The world is necessarily finite in time and space.- Its finitude is unthinkable. (2) The world is composed of ultimate simple parts. The simple is unthinkable and it is impossible to construct from the simple (unextended) the extended world. (3) The chains of the causal series must have a final link, upon which it depends. There can be no link in the causal series that the understanding can regard as final that it must not necessarily view as due to an antecedent cause. Thus reason is cleft in two and necessarily affirms and denies the same thing. Instead of one solution there are two contradictory ones and each seems capable of being demonstrated with equal force. It is clearly evident that on the pre-

supposition of realism the contradictions are absolutely insoluble. Kant therefore concludes it can be only on the supposition that the world in space and time is merely phenomenal that the contradiction will disappear. Thus, in the exposition of the Dialectic, the doctrine of the antimonies appears to confirm the position of transcendental idealism.

To make more explicit the solution which Kant offers, it is to be borne in mind that he regards space and time as well as bodies and the motion of bodies and therefore the causal series also not as having absolute existence but as being only phenomena which the subject fashions by means of productive synthesis."They are only in and through the function of synthesis. This function is by nature neither a finite nor an actual infinite, but a potential infinite. It can always be carried out further. Take the numerical series, for illustration. It is not finite for I can by addition always pass beyond any particular number whatever. But neither is it infinite. It does not exist anywhere as a ready existent, infinite series. It has only potential infinity in the notion of the possibility of further synthesis. Precisely the same thing holds in the case of space and time. They have potential infinity in the synthetical function. I can prolong every line in indefinitum, and likewise every lapse of time. But in the

corporeal world that fills space and in the stream of events that fills time, I can never arrive at a point, on the other side of which empty space or empty time begins. And the same is true of division. As every number is divisible in indefinitum so is every space and every space content. And likewise in the casual series regressus and progressus in indefinitum are proposed as a solution; there can be no final member in the series."

This solution is certainly the logical consequence of the results reached in the Aesthetic and Analytic and indeed seems to be the only solution of these problems.

(3). The Rational Theology.

In this critique Kant presents at length, for the purpose of showing their fallacious nature, the three modes of proving the existence of God by means of speculative reason: the ontological, the cosmological and the physico-theological.

The criticism that he would apply to each of these in turn is already, in large measure apparent from his treatment of the rational psychology. God, like the soul is a metaphysical reality outside the range of possible experience and therefore falls outside the categories of the understanding.

The ontological proof infers the existence from the idea of God itself. The unreality of the ens realissimum cannot be thought. Kant's criticism amounts to the following: Existence is no mark of a concept. "Being is no real predicate." i.e. no ideal content that could constitute an element of a concept. A hundred real dollars contain no more ideal content than a hundred possible (thought)dollars. Hence the existence of a thing can never be inferred by means of a logically necessary (analytic) judgment from the concept of it. It can be demonstrated only by means of its direct presentation in perception, or by proving that it is connected with given perceptions in accordance with empirical laws. All existential propositions are synthetic, or everything real is contingent. Necessity, that is, conditioned necessity, is attributable,not to things,but only to judgments, assuming that they are inferred from valid premises. Or Kant holds, with Hume,that "the contrary of every matter of fact is possible."

The cosmological proof argues from the existence of contingent being to the existence of necessary Being. Kant critizes the argument from the view point of his own theory of cognition. Since the axioms of casuality,on which the argument rests is a synthetic judgment,it cannot be applied beyond the limits of ex-

perience. "The principle of Causality has no meaning and no criterion for its use beyond the world of sense, while here it is meant to help us beyond the world of sense."

The physico-theological argument is that which is commonly called the argument from the purposiveness or design which is evident in the order of nature. Now, order and design "may prove the contingency of the form but not of the matter"; they may prove that there is a designer but not that there is a creator of the universe. Kant wishes to "commend and encourage" the use of such a time of reasoning, but he maintains that "it cannot by itself alone establish the existence of a Supreme Being."

The conclusion of the dialectic is, therefore that <u>the ideas do not add to our experience</u>. Speculative philosophy does not add to our knowledge of the soul, the world and God. Nevertheless these ideas, although they do not constitute experience, regulate it so that we cannot better order the faculties of the soul than by acting as if there were a soul; neither can we better order our experience of the external world than by representing it as made up of a multiplicity of created things, each of which stands related to the rest of reality in reciprocal relation necessitated by the law, all of which sprung from a common ground of unity and are ruled by the same guiding principle. Furthermore the

criticism of the ideas shows that while speculative philosophy is unable to establish the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, materialism, fatalism and atheism are equally unable to overthrow our belief in the truth of these doctrines. The ideas therefore clear the way for a rational faith founded on the moral consciousness.

To sum up his destructive criticism of speculative philosophy and of theoretical knowledge in general: There is no transcendent knowledge, no knowledge beyond the limits of experience. In our knowledge of the empirical world there is however a transcendental element, the a priori forms of sensation, the categories and the regulative ideas which make empirical knowledge possible although they do not add to it either in content or in extension. Kant stands firm for the position that the moral consciousness alone takes us beyond experience to the immutable eternal and universally valid ground on which all higher truth rests.

To reach back now over the history of philosophy we can see what the great problem of idealism has been. The motives have at times varied but on the whole they represent one continuous effort to find that which is fundamentally real and in the light of that to explain the world. In Plato and Aristotle the great

question centers about the relation of form and matter and the relation of the universal to the particular. In Plotinus the Platonic doctrine of God and of the ideas is enlarged upon and the world is explained through the "One" who is the source of all organic life and change.

With the advent of modern philosophy, Descartes, building on the presupposition of Christianity that in God we live and move and have our being, postulated God as the supreme substance from which mind and matter are derivatives and sought by making the Divine the ground of concomitance between them to prove that our sensation must be the true guide to all genuine knowledge.

In Leibnitz we have an idealist of a different type but a man who for the most part impresses one as an eclectic. In his doctrine of innate ideas he is Platonic while his monads seem merely the atoms of Democritus, spiritualized. His doctrine is subtle and elusive but fails to satisfy because it is uncritical-the relation between mind and body is explained by the question begging epithet of pre-established harmony and like other speculative thinkers before him, he fell into the error of scholastic realism by taking it for granted that what was true in formal logic was valid in the empirical realm.

The good Bishop Berkeley, true to the character of his office,

found the motive for his philosophy in the desire to destroy skepticism and atheism. He is a genuine Platonist but by virtue of his religious interest he is more directly connected with Descartes, while from another point of view he is closely allied to the empiricism of Locke. It was for this reason that Kant described his philosophy as material idealism. But it is very important to understand what Berkeley meant by the term matter. This term, used in its philosophical sense, meant an occult substance underlying what is present to sensation. The doctrine that the realities of things were not made for man and that he must rest satisfied with mere appearance was regarded, and rightly, by him as the parent of skepticism with all her desolating train. Contrary to general opinion, Berkeley did not contradict the evidence of the senses, he did not propound a theory at variance in this point with the ordinary belief of mankind. His peculiarity is that he confined himself exclusively to the evidence of the senses. It thus becomes evident why he is called an empirical idealist. The world is as it seems but the "rub" in his system as a philosophy is that he supplies no adequate proof of God who is supposed to give us these ideas and in whose idea all things have their existence.

It thus becomes more and more explicit how the tendency of

idealistic thinking is the world problem of finding the real and through it to explain all. Hegel himself comes back at the old problem of form and matter and of the relation of the universal to the particular. The terminology has changed but the old problem is easily apparent.

It is a far cry from Plato to Kant but we are now able to see the problem in its right relations. With the Greek we began our study of the shadowy ideas with which Plato wrestled long and earnestly, probably not quite certain himself of his own meaning. Aristotle supplies us with a more definite conception of God but the relation of individual forms to the Supreme Form or Diety is left by him as an open question. Plotinus postulates his "One" on a higher plane than God himself and guided by empirical observation contrives to show the organic relation of all things to this supreme entity which is beyond thought and being.

In modern philosophy there is no real break with the ancient and yet its thought is dominated by the fertile concept which Christianity brought into the world. The Christian God is the ground of all concomitance and He is uncritically made responsible for whatever cannot be otherwise explained.

In Kant a new epoch is reached for he shifts the center of things from God to individual consciousness; he upset the current

theology by removing the foundations of the old metaphysics and lays bare the assumptions founded on what seemed to be axioms and shows the need of transcending them. He wrought what he appropriately called the Copernican revolution in philosophy by demonstrating that the fundamental problem was that of epistemology for on the solution of this question depends how we should attack those which are ethical and religious.

It was the crowning merit of Kant that he was critical and supplied what philosophy had long suffered for want of- a science of the understanding. When for the first time in the history of thought he proves that time and space are a priori and thus reduces the world to phenomena he has made a great advance, but to supplement this with the categories as the tie that binds and makes experience possible; to relegate the unknowable God of the Cartesians to a realm outside theoretical reason and to unite empirical observation with the spontaneous action of the categories; this sort of philosophy by its conservatism commends itself alike to common sense and scientific method.

It must be obvious even to one not familiar with the history of philosophy what a diversity of views are represented by men who may be called idealists. They represent widely different attitudes of mind and yet they are, so to speak, organically related.

To me it seems impossible to give an adequate definition of the word for the meaning, characteristic of philosophy itself, is rather an attitude of mind, a process, the meaning of which is apparent only through the effort of understanding its chief representatives. So too, Kant's real and exact relation to idealism cannot be expressed in a paragraph but is rather to be found explicit, if I mistake not, in the salient featured and organic conception which the writer has aimed to express of the entire movement under review.

It is not my purpose to undertake a serious negative criticism of this greatest of modern thinkers for this would carry us beyond the requirement of our theme, and philosophers themselves have more than once betrayed their own lack of insight into the subtlety of the Kantian doctrines. Indeed, though the shortcomings of our philosopher have been pointed out again and again it is not likely that Kant would be willing to accept the constructive results of any of his successors as a valuable supplement to his own conclusions.

There are, to be sure, those who do not so much as wish to disparage the result of Kant's labors who have no hesitancy in calling attention to his failure to determine the real nature of the categories or to make a consistent "deduction" of them; and

although his system may not escape the danger of solipsism or leave us satisfied on account of the agnostic tendency to assert the unknowability of the ding an sich, nevertheless, though Kant may not have done all that he desired or even as much as he believed himself to have accomplished, I yet feel a keen appreciation of his work, and this too, not for theoretical reasons only but for practical as well. It is not too much to say that under the stimulating leadership and moral enthusiasm of his interpreter he has become a dominating factor in my life. This philosopher is a moral hero and like Plato of old, it is the ethical interest which consciously or unconsciously dominates all his life and work. These men show us that philosophy is life and whether they be forging through the Parmenides or deducing the categories in the Analytic there is no idle principle at state. Both alike are concerned, and vitally, to answer and upset the skepticism and sophistry that is undermining society. These were no journey-men philosophers but heroes to a faith which meant more to them than they could see. For them there are eternal verities and they set about vigorously to demonstrate their convictions.

Kant is of pre-eminent value to me because he has changed my attitude both toward the material world and the eternal order; he has enhanced my sense of the dignity of the individual both

subjectively and objectively. He has convinced me of the superiority of man over nature, that the world is primarily what we make it and not the reverse. Furthermore, he has supplied us with a criterion by which to judge, shown the limit of the faculties of the understanding and how it finds its supplement in the sphere of the Practical Reason. Thus, by arbitrating boundaries he has called a halt to much idle speculation rampant before the advent of the Critique and at the same time laid a sound foundation for succeeding philosophy. His system cannot be ultimate, and if the history of philosophy teaches anything it shows that no one system is likely to be recognized as such, but who will be rash enough to deny that they reckon ill who leave him out for we can not only honor him for what he was and did but we can endorse him as the Teacher of <u>our</u> children.

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